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Abstract
In this work we develop a novel Bayesian neural
network methodology to achieve strong adver-
sarial robustness without the need for online ad-
versarial training. Unlike previous efforts in this
direction, we do not rely solely on the stochastic-
ity of network weights by minimizing the diver-
gence between the learned parameter distribution
and a prior. Instead, we additionally require that
the model maintain some expected uncertainty
with respect to all input covariates. We demon-
strate that by encouraging the network to dis-
tribute evenly across inputs, the network becomes
less susceptible to localized, brittle features which
imparts a natural robustness to targeted perturba-
tions. We show empirical robustness on several
benchmark datasets.
1. Introduction
Neural networks currently achieve greater-than-human per-
formance in a variety of tasks such as object recognition (He
et al., 2016), language understanding (Vaswani et al., 2017;
Devlin et al., 2018), and game playing (Silver et al., 2016;
2017). Despite their incredible successes, these same net-
works are easily fooled by seemingly-trivial perturbations
that humans overcome with minimal difficulty (Goodfellow
et al., 2014). This weakness poses considerable concern in a
world that is increasingly reliant on machines from the per-
spectives of both security (e.g., face recognition) and safety
(driverless cars). Despite considerable effort to overcome
these difficulties, the problem persists (Elsayed et al., 2018;
Athalye et al., 2018).
The most successful methods for improving adversarial ro-
bustness utilize online adversarial training (Madry et al.,
2017). Online adversarial training requires an iterative train-
ing procedure where adversarial examples are produced
based on a particular attack scheme with respect to the cur-
rent network state and the model is updated to resist the
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particular attack. Unfortunately, this method is computa-
tionally expensive, as attacks must be generated and the
model updated multiple times. Zhang et al. and Sharma
& Chen have demonstrated that while this process makes
the model robust to the particular type of attack used in the
training process, the model can be susceptible to attacks
from alternate schemes.
To scale adversarial training, researchers have tried to trans-
fer adversarial examples from another model. Trame`r et al.
has found that this offline adversarial training scheme can
perform equitably well in practice but can be much more
efficient since it decouples the adversarial examples genera-
tion from the training process.
Alternative lines of research introduce randomness into the
model. Early attempts include adding Gaussian noise to the
inputs (Zantedeschi et al., 2017) and randomly pruning the
network (Wang et al., 2018; Dhillon et al., 2018). Liu et al.
propose to add Gaussian noise to all the intermediate activa-
tions. Wang et al. train multiple copies for each block of the
network and randomly select one during inference. Along
these lines, we utilize Bayesian neural networks (BNNs) as
a principled way to inject noise into the model.
Recent work (Liu et al., 2018a;b) has incorporated stochas-
ticity by utilizing BNNs. Similar to our method, they demon-
strate that randomness of BNNs alone is not sufficient for
robust classification. They turn to an online adversarial
training scheme to implicitly boost the randomness.
We instead choose to explicitly penalize the model so that
it evenly distributes the sensitivity of the output w.r.t. the
input elements. We estimate the output sensitivity for each
input through a first order Taylor approximation and exploit
the inherent ensembling of BNNs to evaluate statistics for
each input example. These statistics become the basis for
a defense-promoting regularization scheme by diversifying
the directions of the output.
Our contributions are as follows:
• We propose several general penalties that can be added
to the loss function of any Bayesian neural network to
diversify the output variation with respect to the input
covariates.
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• We demonstrate that increased output diversity leads to
natural adversarial robustness, without requiring online
adversarial training.
• We show that models trained with our diversity induc-
ing penalties generalize to a variety of attack schemes.
This work begins with a review of Bayesian neural networks
and the adversarial problem. We then discuss our motiva-
tions and methods for improving model robustness. Finally,
we illustrate our methods on several datasets and discuss
the implications. Particularly, we show that our method im-
proves robustness over state-of-the-art BNN methods (Liu
et al., 2018b), all without online adversarial training.
2. Background & Related Work
In this section we provide an overview of background mate-
rial and related work.
2.1. Bayesian Neural Networks
In the context of supervised deep learning, a conventional
neural network seeks to perform some variant of a classical
functional estimation task, to learn a point estimate of the
optimal function in the chosen functional space that maps
each input from the input space to its corresponding output
in the output space. However, such an estimate does not
consider, and thus cannot effectively adapt to, the inherent
uncertainty throughout the training procedure (e.g., data col-
lection, random initialization of network weights). Such de-
ficiency leads to problems including over-fitting and overly
confident predictions.
To remedy this deficiency, a Bayesian neural network
(BNN), introduced in the same vein as continuous stochastic
processes such as the Gaussian process, seeks to directly
model the distribution, whose density we denote as p, over
random functions
f ∼ p(f), f : X 7→ O
where X and O denote the input and the output spaces, re-
spectively. However, directly learning such a distribution
can be arduous as functional spaces are usually infinite-
dimensional. Utilizing the fact that neural networks can be
regarded as universal approximators for functions (Hornik
et al., 1989), a distribution over random functions can be
thought of as a choice over of neural networks. We material-
ize such connection through learning a distribution over the
network weights. More specifically, in assuming that the
network weights are random and distributed according to a
prior distribution P (w), a BNN seeks to learn the posterior
distribution of the network weights, w, given the available
data, i.e. P (w|D).
While a clever idea, learning P (w|D) is prohibitively expen-
sive even for moderately sized networks because of the high-
dimensional integral that needs to be evaluated. Borrowing
ideas from variational inference and the recent success of
unsupervised methods like the variational auto-encoder
(Kingma & Welling, 2014), Blundell et al. propose to learn
a variational posterior distribution, q(w|θ), to approximate
the true posterior by optimizing the following objective
max
θ
Eq(w|θ) (logP ((D|w))− KL (q(w|θ)||p(w)) (1)
which is the evidence lower bound (ELBO) for the data
likelihood. The expectation term ensures the learnt vari-
ational posterior distribution is informed by the data, and
the KL divergence acts as a regularizer over the weights.
Although technically any choice of the variational poste-
rior and prior distributions pair is possible, the convention,
which we adopt in this work, is to choose both to be indepen-
dent Gaussians where we learn the mean and variances of
the variational posterior distribution. One benefit of deploy-
ing a BNN, which we exploit in our proposed framework, is
that for one input one can draw multiple functions f , which
in practice is actualized by drawing a set of different weights
from the posterior distribution P (w|D), to form an ensem-
ble of inferences for various purposes, such as assessing
the uncertainties in predictions, gradient evaluations, etc. In
this work, we exploit the networks variation to control how
much sensitivity we expect from each input element.
2.2. Adversarial Attack
Adversarial examples are constructed by making small per-
turbations to the input that induce a dramatic change in the
output. Attacks are typically broken down into two cate-
gories: white and black box attacks. The exact definition of
both methods vary, but we will use the following definition
in this work. In the white box setting, the attack has access
to the training data set, the fully specified underlying model,
and the loss functions. Attacks are found by performing
gradient ascent with respect to the input. In the black box
setting, the attacker has access to the training data and the
loss functions but does not have access to the underlying
model parameters. A black box attack can then be con-
structed by using a stand-in network trained on the same
data with the same loss. Previous works have shown that
these examples are still effective against a variety of other
models (Liu et al., 2016; Trame`r et al., 2017b).
The attacker’s goal is:
max
‖ε‖p<εmax
E [L (f(x+ ε; θ),y)] (2)
where ε is the attack perturbation, p is the norm (typically
taken to be ∞), εmax is the attack budget (the maximum
perturbation), L is the loss, f is the network, x is the input,
θ is the network parameters, and y is the truth.
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Typically the attack methods generate the adversarial exam-
ples by leveraging the gradient of the loss function with re-
spect to the inputs. The Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM)
(Goodfellow et al., 2014), for instance, takes one step along
the gradient direction to perturb an input by the amount ε:
xadv = x+ ε · sign(∇xL(f(x; θ),y)). (3)
Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) (Madry et al., 2017)
generalizes FGSM by taking multiple gradient updates:
xk = xk−1 + α · sign(∇xL(f(x; θ),y)), (4)
where α is the step size. After each update, PGD projects the
perturbed inputs back into the ε-ball of the normal inputs.
There are also other types of attacks, such as C&W attack
(Carlini & Wagner, 2017), Jacobian Saliency Map Attack
(JSMA) (Papernot et al., 2016) and DeepFool (Moosavi-
Dezfooli et al., 2016). Among all the attack methods, PGD
is regarded as the strongest attack in terms of the L∞ norm.
2.3. Adversarial Defense
The goal of adversarial defense is to render all (bounded)
perturbations ineffective against a model. It is necessary to
bound the perturbation or the attack could simply replace an
input with an example from a different distribution or class.
A simple intuition to achieve this would be to require that
the model be Lipschitz smooth such that
‖f(x+ ε; θ)− f(x; θ)‖ < C ‖ε‖ . (5)
Unfortunately, estimating the Lipschitz coefficient C for
an arbitrary network can be extremely difficult, making
optimizing over it nontrivial. Cisse´ et al. has attempted to
control the Lipschitz coefficient of each layer in the network
and, therefore, the network as a whole.
Recent works have introduced a number of defense methods,
such as distillation (Papernot et al., 2016), label smoothing
(Hazan et al., 2016), input denoising (Song et al., 2017),
feature denoising (Xie et al., 2019), gradient regularization
(Ross & Doshi-Velez, 2018), and preprocessing based ap-
proaches (Das et al., 2017; Guo et al., 2017; Buckman et al.,
2018). Most of these defenses have unfortunately been
defeated by subsequent attacks.
The most popular adversarial defense technique incorpo-
rates adversarial examples in the training process (Madry
et al., 2017). Online adversarial training requires generat-
ing new examples throughout the training process to map
out the local region around known examples and require
that the region map to the expected output. Unfortunately,
while this approach does produce a robust defense, it is
computationally expensive.
Most similar to our work, ADV-BNN (Liu et al., 2018b)
attempts to use BNN to combat adversarial attack. Their
proposed method is dependent on online adversarial training
and aims to incorporate it into the standard ELBO objective,
Eq. (1), as a min-max problem. In contrast, our proposed
methodology does not require online adversarial training,
and achieves better performance on CIFAR-10 compared to
ADV-BNN.
2.3.1. OBFUSCATED GRADIENTS
Athalye et al. warn of a failure mode in defense methods that
they term “obfuscated gradients,” where seemingly high ad-
versarial accuracy is only superficial. Networks that achieve
apparent improvements in white box attacks through obfus-
cated gradients do so by making it difficult for an attacker
to find ε. However, successful ε still exist, which indicates
that the network has not increased adversarial accuracy de-
spite its improved adversarial test accuracy. Distinguishing
between whether a defense mechanism has increased ad-
versarial accuracy or merely increased attack difficulty is
nontrivial. Typical methods rely on comparing white-box
and black-box attacks. A strong indication that a defense is
obfuscating gradients is when black-box attacks are success-
ful while white-box attacks fail (low black-box accuracy
and high white-box accuracy). A defense with high-white
box accuracy and fair black-box accuracy is indicative of a
mixture of obfuscated gradients and substantive adversarial
accuracy improvement.
3. Motivation
Our primary motivation comes from the observation that
the fewer inputs an attack needs to perturb, the less robust a
model is. Therefore, we wish to diversify the importance of
each input to the output. Alternatively, we wish to reduce the
sensitivity of the output to variations in each input, possibly
weighted by some foreknowledge of input uncertainty.
Since adversarial examples are best known for image recog-
nition due to the dramatic difference in human robustness
versus machine robustness, we attempt to provide some in-
tuition in this setting. For the general image setting, the
object of interest may exist anywhere in image, and there is
no way to know ahead of time which pixels are more reli-
able. Therefore, we assume that, on average, the sensitivity
due to any single pixel should be roughly equal. So, we
estimate the sensitivity per pixel, normalize across pixels,
and penalize any divergence from our expectation.
We can estimate the sensitivity of the mth output, δym, with
respect to the expected sensitivity of the dth input, δxd,
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through a truncated Taylor series
δym,d(x) ≡ ym(x− δxd)− ym(x) (6)
≈ δxTd
∂ym(x)
∂x
= δxd
∂ym(x)
∂xd
(7)
and collecting across inputs
δym(x) ≈ δx∇ym(x) (8)
where δym is a length D vector corresponding to the sen-
sitivity of the mth output with respect to each input. For
simplicity, we assume there is only one output and drop the
dependence on m.
There are several ways to normalize the result across inputs.
We choose to normalize by the L2 norm. For datasets where
each input is equitably important/reliable, δxd = δx and the
normalized result becomes
uy(x) = δy/||δy||2 = ∇y/ ‖∇y‖2 (9)
where uy(x) is the direction of the gradient of the the output
with respect to the input, x.
This result means that we expect the direction of the output
gradient to be uniformly distributed over the unit hyper-
sphere. In terms of the loss surface, all directions become
equally likely.
uy ∼ Usph(u) (10)
In the event where the input uncertainty varies, the distribu-
tion would be uniformly distributed over a hyper-ellipsoid.
4. Method
Typically, neural networks are supervised to map an input
to an output. We use the approximation from Sec. 3 to
further supervise the uncertainty of the output. However,
all networks have some inherent uncertainty (e.g., from
random initializations) that changes the expected sensitivity.
We execute K draws of the BNN and include additional
penalties that attempt to maintain the expected distribution
of the output sensitivity. We experiment with a variety of
penalties based on this premise. For the sake of brevity, we
drop the dependence of uy on x.
4.1. Entropy and Variances
As motivated previously, in order to increase the network’s
robustness against adversarially perturbed input, we encour-
age the network to maintain, and hence to evenly distribute,
some expected sensitivity with respect to all input covariates.
We materialize this idea by encouraging the normalized gra-
dient in Eq. (9) to be uniformly distributed over the unit
hypersphere, which in turn is equivalent to maximizing the
entropy of uy, denoted as H(uy), because uy is bounded
within the unit hypersphere. However, as a function of the
network weights w, the density of uy is intractable even
for moderate-sized network, making maximizing H(uy)
directly prohibitively expensive and impractical in practice.
In a simplified setting where the elements are independent,
maximizing the sum of the variances of each element is
equivalent to maximizing the entropy of the random vector.
Proposition 1. Given a random vector X =
(X1, X2, · · · , XD)T where its elements are indepen-
dent and Xi ∈ [ai, bi] for all i, there exists a monotonically
increasing relationship between the entropy of X, H(X),
and the sum of the variances of each element of X,∑
i Var(Xi).
Proposition 1 indicates that maximizing the entropy of X is
equivalent to maximizing
∑
i Var(Xi). See Appendix A for
the proof. While uy is not independent in our case, we use
Prop. 1 as an analogy and adopt the sum of the variances of
the elements of uy as a surrogate for H(uy).
4.2. Direct Loss
A simple method might be to maximize the sum over inputs
of the variance of uy across the K draws
D∑
d=1
Var [uy,d] . (11)
However, since uy is a unit vector, this loss degenerates
and only serves to minimize the average value of the output
sensitivity
D∑
d=1
Var [uy,d] = E
[
D∑
d=1
u2y,d
]
−
D∑
d=1
E [uy,d]2 (12)
= 1−
D∑
d=1
E [uy,d]2 . (13)
Since we wish to maximize the variances w.r.t. uy(x) we
consider the mean penalty ΩM (x):
ΩM (x) =
D∑
d=1
E [uy,d]2 . (14)
4.3. MinVar
While Equation (14) increases the total variance across in-
puts, it does not necessarily encourage diversity. We con-
sider several additional penalties to include with Eq. (14)
that do increase diversity.
A simple penalty to increase the minimum variance over
dimensions is
ΩV,1(x) = −min
d
Var [uy,d] . (15)
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Equation (15) exploits the fact that the sum (over dimen-
sions) of the variance is fixed. Therefore, increasing the
minimum necessarily decreases the other values. In theory,
as the network trains, the minimum element changes and
eventually all the elements converge to the same variance.
Unfortunately, since the loss only supervises one pixel at a
time, the minimum shifts across a few elements and never
influences the pixels with the largest variance. We consider
two simple methods to correct this difficulty. One is to
supervise all the pixels simultaneously by replacing the min
operation with a soft-min weighted sum so that Eq. (15)
becomes
ΩV,2(x) = −
D∑
d=1
softmin(αuy,d) · Var [uy,d] (16)
where α corresponds to the temperature. However, since
the sum of the variances is fixed and this loss attempts to
increase the variance of all pixels simultaneously, we find
that it can result in a counterproductive competition across
pixels.
A more direct method to supervise the variance is to min-
imize the distance between the observed variance and the
expected variance of 1/N . Using the Euclidean distance,
Eq. (15) becomes
ΩV,3(x) =
D∑
d=1
(Var [uy,d]− 1/D)2 . (17)
We find that this final representation yields the best results
amongst the variance encouraging losses and choose it as
the variance penalty ΩV (x).
4.4. Non-Sparse Promoting Losses
Directly encouraging the model to match a specific distribu-
tion’s second order moment may be too strict a requirement.
As an alternative to matching the second moment of the uni-
form hypersphere, we consider penalizing small L1 norms
of uy. By requiring that the L1 norm be large, we bias the
network away from over reliance on a few features and en-
courage greater diversity across the input covariates. Unlike
in the variance-based losses, the network does not have to
match each input direction to the same value. This allows
for increased flexibility while still maintaining the same
intuitive effect on the diversity of dependence. The added
penalty becomes
ΩS(x) = −E
[‖uy‖1] . (18)
4.5. Batch Loss
We summarize the full possible loss of our model with re-
spect to posterior parameters, L(θ), with all the above penal-
ties, a supervised loss l and a batch of data {(xn, yn)}Nn=1:
L(θ) = 1
N
N∑
n=1
[
l(xn, yn) + λMΩM (xn)
+λV ΩV (xn) + λSΩS(xn)
]
.
(19)
We vary Eq. (19) below, by setting various penalty weights
λ to zero.
4.6. Further Benefits of Adversarial Training
Finally, we test the benefits of offline adversarial training
(Trame`r et al., 2017a) in addition to the diversity inducing
penalties. Adversarial examples are pre-computed from a
trained, non-Bayesian neural network of a matching archi-
tecture and then added statically to the training set. Thus,
this form of defense is more efficient than online adver-
sarial training, which requires on-the-fly computation of
adversarial examples.
5. Experiments
In this section we explore the effect of inducing diversity on
a variety of open-source datasets.
5.1. Penalty Shorthand
We present our results by adding different combinations of
the diversity-encouraging penalties in Sec. 4. To declutter
the results, we use the following shorthand to refer to the
different penalties we apply to the model. The unit gradient
mean penalty, Eq. (14), is given as “M;” the variance penalty,
Eq. (17), by “V;” the non-sparse penalty, Eq. (18), by “S;”
and any offline training by “Off.” We additionally denote
when a network is Bayesian by prepending the network
name with a “B.” For example, the case where we use a
Bayesian VGG16 with the mean and variance penalty is
shorthanded as “BVGG16-M-V.”
As mentioned previously, all adversarial examples appended
to the training set for offline training were constructed using
conventional networks with matching architectures. Aside
from the models trained with offline adversaries, we do not
include any form of data augmentation.
5.2. Practical Considerations
In this section we discuss several practical steps taken to im-
plement various networks and diversity-promoting penalties.
We utilize TensorFlow (Abadi et al., 2015) and Tensorflow
Probability (Dillon et al., 2017) to implement the general
and probabilistic components of our models, respectively.
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5.2.1. DRAWING FROM THE BAYESIAN NETWORK
Since we optimize over statistics of the probabilistic net-
work, we require multiple network samples for the same
input data. A simple method to exploit extant parallelisms in
most neural network frameworks would be to duplicate each
element in the batch K (the number of draws) times. Unfor-
tunately, Bayesian networks implement the Bayesian layers
using either FlipOut (Wen et al., 2018) or the reparameteri-
zation trick (Kingma & Welling, 2014) to efficiently draw
parameters that are shared across each element in the batch.
While this shortcut is sufficient to decorrelate training gradi-
ents, it is not sufficient to obtain the level of independence
required to inform our methods. As a result, we resort to
executing the network K times for each batch.
This becomes prohibitively expensive for networks of suf-
ficient depth. To offset some of this cost, we break our
networks into two parts. In the first part, the layers are
constructed in the conventional fashion without Bayesian
components. We will refer to this component of our models
as the deterministic network. After the deterministic net-
work, we construct a Bayesian network. The deterministic
component is executed once per batch and the Bayesian
component, K times. The gradient that informs diversity
promotion is still taken with respect to the input of the full
network. This means that while the deterministic component
does not directly add variation it is still trained to encourage
overall network diversity. The specifics of where the tran-
sition between determinism and Bayesian can be found in
each experiment’s section. In general, we found that it was
sufficient to set the last quarter of the network as Bayesian
and use K = 10 draws.
5.2.2. ATTACK SCHEMES
We test our defense against two types of common attacks:
the Fast-Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) and Projected Gra-
dient Descent (PGD). We deploy both L∞ and L2 attacks.
Black box attacks are performed using examples from exter-
nal sources when available. All attacks are performed using
the Adversarial Robustness Toolbox (Nicolae et al., 2018)
and use the same number of network draws as are used in
training.
5.3. MNIST
We test our diversity induced models on MNIST (LeCun &
Cortes, 2010). For these tests we use a simple CNN with
three convolutional layers followed by two fully connected
layers. Since this network is fairly shallow, we compose
the deterministic part of the network using the first two
convolutional layers and use Bayesian layers for the final
convolutional and both fully connected layers. When the
corresponding penalty is used, the loss hyperparameters are:
λM = 20, λV = 40, and λS = 40.
Table 1. Adversarial accuracy (%) on MNIST with various combi-
nations of diversity promotion against L∞ attacks.
Method FGSM PGD Black-Box
CNN 36.8 2.6 57.8
BNN 55.2 0.9 56.4
BNN-Off 40.0 2.1 93.6
M 93.0 55.2 60.1
M-V 94.0 70.0 61.8
M-S 96.3 94.0 54.3
M-V-S 97.2 95.8 59.8
M-S-Off 97.6 95.8 89.9
M-V-S-Off 97.4 94.5 90.6
Table 1 shows the accuracy of the model when trained using
different combinations of diversity inducing penalties and
adversarial training against L∞ attacks with a maximum
attack budget of 0.3. All models obtain better than 99%
standard accuracy. Black box attacks were obtained using
examples from an open repository.1
When only the mean penalty (Eq. (14)) is imposed, the
model shows modest improvements in both forms of attack;
indicating that the defense has succeeded in improving the
robustness of the model against attack. While this defense
has not completely succeeded in overcoming attacks, it is
a positive step. As we include additional penalties, we ob-
serve that the white-box attack improves, most notably with
the inclusion of the non-sparse penalty (Sec. 4.4). However,
these models generally show a slight decrease in black-box
performance. We infer that these penalties tend to cause the
model to over fit the defense by obfuscating gradients. For-
tunately, offline adversarial training appears to sufficiently
augment the training set so that the defenses can generalize.
5.3.1. MNIST ACCURACY EVOLUTION
Figure 1 illustrates how the adversarial accuracy evolves
over the training process. We chose to train for 100 epochs
to give the defenses adequate opportunity to influence the
model. Figure 1a shows attack accuracy against the FGSM
and Fig. 1b shows accuracy against PGD. In both cases,
attacks are generated using the test set against the current
model state. These figures provide some insight into how the
defense is instilled in the model as it is trained. The mean
and variances penalties appear to slowly (but consistently)
influence the model throughout the training process. These
penalties seem to still be improving the adversarial accuracy
against PGD attacks even after 100 epochs have elapsed,
well after the standard accuracy has converged.
As speculated in Sec. 4.4, the non-sparse penalty appears to
give the model greater flexibility and is easier to learn. This
1https://github.com/MadryLab/mnist challenge
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quick increase and the disparity between white and black
box performance in Table 1 may indicate that the penalty
is prone to causing the defense to over fit by obfuscating
gradients. However, this is assuaged with the use of offline
adversarial training. All models converged to a standard
accuracy of 99% within the first two epochs.
(a) FGSM L∞ ε = 0.3
(b) PGD L∞ ε = 0.3
Figure 1. Evolving white box attack accuracy after each epoch.
5.4. CIFAR-10
In this section, we evaluate our proposed diversity induc-
ing penalties on the CIFAR-10 dataset (Krizhevsky et al.).
The backbone network is VGG16. A Bayesian version of
VGG16 is built by replacing the last convolutional block
and the fully connected layers with variational alternatives.
When training with our proposed penalties, we use the hy-
parameters: λM = 10 and λS = 20. We report the L∞
attack with a budget of ε = 0.03 here. PGD attack perform
40 gradient updates with a step size 0.001. Refer to Sec. 6
for ablation experiments on the attack budget. We report
the black box attack accuracy using examples from an open
repository.2
Table 2 demonstrates the accuracy of the defended mod-
els on CIFAR-10. The standard loss is included in the
table since it varies across models. Given the marginal im-
provements in adversarial accuracy from the variance-based
penalties, we forego their use in this case.
Unlike in the MNIST experiments, the mean penalty is insuf-
2https://github.com/MadryLab/cifar10 challenge
Table 2. Adversarial accuracy (%) under L∞ white box attack
and black box attack on CIFAR-10 with various combinations of
diversity promotion.
Loss Std. FGSM PGD Black-Box
VGG16 90.4 14.4 5.9 58.0
BVGG16 89.1 12.9 5.6 24.5
BVGG16-Off 85.8 58.8 57.0 84.3
M 90.1 14.2 6.1 64.1
M-S 88.4 50.2 47.7 55.2
M-S-Off 86.3 73.1 72.3 84.8
Table 3. Comparison of accuracy (%) under PGD attack with dif-
ferent budget. We use the same attack as in (Liu et al., 2018b) to
make comparisons fair. Results for “Adv-CNN” and “Adv-BNN,”
representing adversarially trained CNN and BNN, are from (Liu
et al., 2018b). Note, we use offline generated adversarial examples
to train our model, which is much more efficient.
Method/Budget 0.0 0.015 0.035 0.055 0.07
Adv-CNN 80.3 58.3 31.1 15.5 10.3
Adv-BNN 79.7 68.7 45.4 26.9 18.6
M-S 88.4 61.3 47.8 39.8 34.3
BVGG16-Off 85.8 58.2 57.8 57.3 57.3
M-S-Off 86.3 73.2 73.1 73.0 73.0
ficient to overcome white box attacks; however, it does offer
improvements in the black box setting. Also unlike MNIST,
these results do not indicate that our methods suffer from
the obfuscated gradients problem as white box attacks are
consistently more effective than black box attacks. The ad-
ditional data augmentation from offline adversarial training
further improves defense.
Table 3 juxtaposes several of our proposed defenses against
results reported in Liu et al. for several attack budgets. We
observe that our method without any adversarial training
maintains higher standard accuracy and shows improved ro-
bustness to higher attacks budgets. Surprisingly, we observe
that a Bayesian VGG16 with offline adversarial training
obtains consistent accuracy above the other methods. We
suspect this is because the adversarial examples used in
offline training were constructed using PGD with 40 steps
whereas the examples in ADV-BNN were defended using
online training with 10 steps. Including our penalties con-
sistently increases the performance of the offline model by
approximately 15%.
6. Ablation
To test our defenses’ efficacy under more diverse attack
cases, we vary the attack budget with PGD against our
models trained on CIFAR-10. Figure 2 illustrates the results
from all of our tests.
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(a) L∞ attack budgets.
(b) L2 attack budgets.
Figure 2. Varying attack budgets with 40 step PGD attacks against
CIFAR-10 defenses.
Figure 2a demonstrates how the various models respond
to increases in the attack budget of PGD L∞ attacks. Un-
surprisingly, all the models show decreases in performance
as the attack budget is increased. The best model is con-
sistently the mean and non-sparse penalized models with
offline adversarial training. The diversity penalties consis-
tently improve the accuracy over offline training by approx-
imately 15%. Strangely, the mean and non-sparse encour-
aging penalties without offline augmentation experience a
steady decrease in performance and is quickly outpaced by
offline augmentation.
Figure 2b uses L2 attacks but otherwise demonstrates the
same variation as in Fig. 2a (changes in the attack budget
of PGD). The most interesting feature is how well the mean
penalty performs without any additional augmentations. It
begins with the highest accuracy and is consistently higher
than the model trained with the mean and non-sparse penal-
ties and is primarily outperformed only by the full mean and
non-sparse penalized models with offline training. Other-
wise, the results are consistent with those found in the L∞
study.
7. Discussion
We have demonstrated the efficacy of explicitly encouraging
diversity of the output with respect to the input. On MNIST,
we show that we can obtain strong adversarial robustness
without the need for any form of adversarial training. In
this case, our black box accuracy falls short of the white
box accuracy, indicating we may be obfuscating gradients.
Fortunately, the black box performance is still fair, which
may mean that our method improves model robustness and
obfuscates gradients. Including offline adversarial training
in these models improves the black box accuracy so that
it is on par with the white box accuracy. We suspect that
the original MNIST training set is not diverse enough itself
and that additional data or augmentations may be sufficient
to prevent the defense from over fitting and obfuscating
gradients.
Our results on CIFAR-10 are quite encouraging. We demon-
strate that our method is capable of improving adversarial
accuracy with only a small reduction in standard accuracy.
These models do not appear to suffer from the obfuscated
gradients problem: black box accuracy is consistently higher
than white box performance. Further, the ablation studies
show a consistent reduction in accuracy as attack strength
is increased. Finally, our model compares favorably with
other Bayesian defense mechanisms, achieving superior per-
formance in most cases without any adversarial training.
The added use of offline adversarial training improves our
models’ performance so that they are superior in all cases.
We speculate that it may be possible to further improve our
defense results by including additional forms of standard
augmentation, e.g. the addition of Gaussian noise, shift-
ing, etc. Similarly, we performed only a small search for
the hyperparameters of the diversity penalties, λ, and used
them for all penalty combinations and regardless of the use
of offline training. Additional gains may be possible by
performing a finer-grained search over these parameters.
8. Conclusions
In this work, we built upon the Bayesian neural network
framework and introduced a novel technique, namely De-
fense through Diverse Directions, to achieve strong adver-
sarial robustness. This is a daunting task, where models
that utilize the concept of randomness to combat adversar-
ial attack were previously limited to adding random noise
layers to the network (Liu et al., 2018a) or simply applying
a Bayesian neural network to take advantage of the stochas-
ticity of the weights (Liu et al., 2018b). To the best of
our knowledge, this is the first attempt to attain adversarial
robustness through explicitly requiring the network to main-
tain and evenly distribute expected and sensible uncertainty
with respect to input covariates, achieved by the various
penalty terms we introduce. Without the need for online
adversarial training, we demonstrate the effectiveness and
robustness of our approach by achieving the strong adver-
sarial (after-attack) accuracies on various datasets against
different adversarial attacks.
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A. Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. Suppose X ∼ fX(x). Since the elements of X are
independent, the entropy of the random vector X equals the
sum of the entropy of each individual element
H(X) = −
∫
x
f(x) log f(x)dx
= −
∑
i
∫
x
∏
j
f(xj)
 log f(xi)dx
= −
∑
i
∫
xi
f(xi) log f(xi) dxi
=
∑
i
H(Xi)
(20)
and that
H(Xi) =
∫
xi
f(xi) log
1
f(xi)
dxi
=
∫
xi
(xi − µi)2f(xi) log
(
e
1
(xi−µi)2 +
1
f(xi)
)
dxi.
Since by assumption each Xi is bounded in a compact in-
terval, we have log
(
e1/(xi−µi)
2
+ 1/f(xi)
)
> 1. It also
achieves its maximum and minimum values on this compact
interval which we denote as k and h, respectively. We then
have
h · Var[Xi] ≤ H(Xi) ≤ k · Var[Xi]
indicating that maximizing the entropy of X is equivalent to
maximizing
∑
i Var(Xi).
B. Additional Results
Method BIM CW FGM PGD
CNN 7.1 30.5 36.8 2.6
BNN 5.5 88.9 55.2 0.9
BNN-Off 4.8 - 40.0 2.1
M 88.2 73.0 93.0 55.2
M-V 89.5 67.4 94.0 70.0
M-S 97.1 75.4 96.3 94.0
M-V-S 97.8 78.8 97.2 95.8
M-S-Off 97.2 65.6 97.6 95.8
M-V-S-Off 97.5 61.9 97.4 94.5
Table 4. Adversarial accuracy on MNIST with various combina-
tions of diversity promotion against L∞ attacks.
(a) art attack
(b) art attack
Figure 3. White box attack accuracy after each epoch.
